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Dual Identity and Multiple Tasks: 
Contemporary Chinese Party Media’s 
Involvement in Political Communication
Xu Jing and Wang Dengfeng
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7358/lcm-2018-002-xuwa
Abstract
Alongside the reform and opening-up policies in China since 1978, there has 
been a transformation of China’s governmental functions and of its media system. 
While adapting to the complex political process towards democratization, the 
Chinese Communist Party media have further expanded their dual identity as 
both organizational communicator and mass communicator, and are involved 
in Chinese political communication in a variety of ways. To improve the role 
of internal organizational communication, the Party media have extended their 
sphere of activity from traditional Internal Reference (xinwen neican 新闻内参) to 
Online Public Opinion Monitoring (yuqing jiance 舆情监测) and Media Think 
Tank Consultation (meiti zhiku 媒体智库). As leaders in China’s market-oriented 
media reform and tech-driven media integration, the Chinese Party media have 
remained dominant and privileged agents in China’s mass media system, and 
active participants in social political communication in a number of ways, from 
traditional policy publicity, to media supervision and timely external opinion 
guiding. 
Keywords: Chinese Party media; functionalism; media policy and system; politi-
cal communication; public opinion.
Although political communication is the most important branch of com-
munication research, the state of academic research into Chinese politi-
cal communication is somewhat embarrassing. On the one hand, the 
huge difference between China’s political reality and the electoral politics 
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 5 (2018) 2
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/ - Online issn 2421-0293 - Print issn 2284-1881
Xu Jing and Wang Dengfeng
12
of the West makes it difficult to apply the theories and methodologies 
of Western political communication research to China. On the other 
hand, it is hard for scholars researching China’s political communication 
to avoid political and ideological interference and highlight its academic 
value. Thus, it is not easy for Chinese scholars to conduct effective dia-
logues with either their Western peers or Chinese practitioners.
“The historical context of the development of China’s journalism is 
clearly different from the Western countries we study […]. In many areas 
of the world, the role of the state is very different, but in more areas of 
the world, it is far closer to the centre of the media system structure than 
in the West” (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The subject of this article has 
not been taken from a literature review of Western political communica-
tion, nor from the use of so-called “advanced” research methods; it is 
based on long-term observation of the Chinese political reality from the 
perspective of political communication. We do hope that it will really 
help to refine the issues of Chinese political communication research 
and lead to an in-depth academic dialogue and exchange of ideas.
The concept of political communication should be derived from 
definitions. Among all the definitions of political communication, the 
author agrees with Nimmo and Sanders’ relatively broad saying, “Politi-
cal communication focuses on communication behaviour and its influ-
ence on the political process” (Nimmo and Sanders 1981, 12). This 
definition reflects the development of politics research from the initial 
political thought to the political system, and then to the political process 
and behavioural research. 
Although the political process varies significantly from country to 
country, it is possible to identify and analyze agents of political com-
munication within a specific political process. For that reason, we have 
chosen to study the dual identity of the Chinese Party’s media roles and 
the way in which they fulfil the function of those roles through under-
taking multiple tasks within the contemporary Chinese public policy 
process.
The term, “Party media” has been coined from a speech by Xi Jin-
ping during a colloquium that he hosted in Beijing on 19 February 2016. 
During the colloquium, he emphasized that “all media run by the Party 
and the government are propaganda fronts of the Party and must have 
‘Party’ as their surname” (Li and Huo 2016). Since then, “Party media” 
has largely replaced the former term “Party newspaper”, but until now 
there has been a lack of academic fruit on the Party media and political 
communication.
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Jing Xu’s Political Communication in the Great Leap Forward Move-
ment, published in Hong Kong in 2004, did some ground-breaking 
research in the field of Chinese political communication (Xu 2004, 
4-12). It featured an in-depth analysis of the Chinese Party media’s com-
munications during the mass political movement of Chairman Mao’s 
era. Well, circumstances change with the passage of time. Since 1978, 
alongside China’s reform and opening-up policies, adapting to the new 
market economy and international co-operation, China has gradually 
changed its ideas and practice on governance from strict control to social 
service.
Following this political transformation, the Chinese Party media 
have shifted their mission from “serving class struggle” to “serving 
socialist modernization”, and have taken the lead in the media’s com-
mercialization reforms and media integration, which have been driven by 
ICTs since the beginning of this century. The composition of contempo-
rary Chinese media is increasingly diverse in terms of technology, capital 
resources and operating mechanisms. As a privileged and dominant part 
of the Chinese media system, the Party media, including the People’s 
Daily, Xinhua News Agency, CCTV 1 and many more Party and local 
governmental organs which constitute China’s mainstream media, have 
undergone substantial change in terms of management ideas, capital 
composition, operating mechanisms and mediamorphosis. The political 
partisan nature of the Chinese Party media differentiates them from the 
Western mainstream media, and also determines their involvement in 
political communication with uniquely Chinese characteristics. Research 
on the current political communication of the Party media not only 
helps to uncover the true nature of Chinese political communication, but 
also examines the aim of such academic research.
 1 CCTV has been transformed through the creation of a new central radio and 
television network, to be known as “Voice of China”. It is the amalgamation of China 
Central Television (including China Global Television Network), China National Radio, 
and China Radio International, and it now serves as an institution directly under the 
State Council.
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1. China’s public policy process and the dual identity
 of the Party media
The political process in most countries is usually based on the public 
policy process. At present, China’s public policy-making process still 
differs in many ways from those in the West. First, it is characterized 
in practice by a “combination of legislature and administration”. The 
executive government is responsible for decision-making, implementa-
tion and major policy revision. As the legislative body, the People’s Con-
gress, from national to local level, in reality stands on the “second line”. 
In recent years, with the reform of the government system, the role of 
the People’s Congress has been strengthened, while the government still 
plays a central and dominant role in the decision-making process.
Second, the phenomenon of “unity of Party and government, with 
Party leading the government” (He and Kong 2011, 61-79) is quite 
obvious, and permeates all aspects of the policy-making process, official 
actions and behaviour. Political stability and the compliance of officials 
form the principles and basis of decision-making. 
Finally, the intersection of “stripes” and “blocks” is a major feature 
of Chinese government administration. The “stripes” refer to the vertical 
lines of authority over various sectors, reaching down from the minis-
tries of central government. The “blocks” refer to the horizontal level of 
authority of territorial government at the provincial or local level (Xue 
and Chen 2005, 99-103).
Even so, there has been an obvious change in Chinese public policy 
process in some respects. 
During 1980, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the 
first spokesman system, and regularly released government information. 
During the SARS outbreak of 2003, the Ministry of Health established its 
second press release system, in response to public concern. Since then, the 
theory of governmental responsiveness has gradually emerged. Based on 
the idea of social governance, it provides a conscious, stable and sustainable 
governmental response mechanism, providing a people-based, service-
oriented response, in good time and within the rule of law. Although the 
national spokesman system largely reflects the Chinese social management 
model, overseen by the government as a single function, it is consist-
ent with the concept of service-oriented government, with its focus on 
improving the government’s capability and quality of public service.
In 1987, the 13th National Party Congress highlighted the principle 
of openness. Since then, China has gradually promoted the publicizing 
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of government affairs, Party affairs, and judicial openness. With the 
promulgation and implementation of the “Regulations of Governmental 
Information Disclosure” in 2007, the Chinese policy-making process has 
gradually changed from the covert authoritarian or élite decision-making 
set-up of Mao’s era to be more open and public, with institutional norms. 
Also in 1987, the 13th National Party Congress formally proposed the 
concept of “public opinion supervision”. This was the first time that the 
concept had been included in the Party’s documentation, and provided 
official assurance with regard to the Party’s role in media supervision. 
Different countries use different mechanisms in the public policy 
process, with a number of internal or external participants. In the West, 
the mass media, as external opinion leaders in policy-making, usually 
spread information about elections, politics and related public issues. 
However, the Chinese Party media had always been characterized by 
internal organizational communication. Moreover, with the develop-
ment of China’s mass media system, originating from the reform and 
opening-up of 1978, the Chinese Party media have gained important 
roles within the current media system. In competition with the other 
media for social news communication, they also function as external 
opinion leaders for political communication. In China, there are cur-
rently two opposing areas of public opinion. One is full of official slogans 
and discourse, while the other is full of alternative views (He and Chen 
2010). For propaganda practitioners, how to bridge the two opinion 
fields and give full play to the role of the Party media is a major question. 
From our viewpoint, as researchers, understanding the dual identity of 
the Party media and their methods of communication may help towards 
a better understanding of the relationship between the media and public 
opinion in Chinese political communication.
2. The development of the Chinese Party media
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, under 
the guidance of Chinese Proletariat Party journalism, with planned 
top-down, step-by-step adjustments, China has established a central-
ized and unified national media network, centred on the People’s Daily 
(人民日报), the Xinhua News Agency (新华通讯社), and the Central Peo-
ple’s Broadcasting Station (中央人民广播电台). The new media system dif-
fered in two ways from its pre-1949 predecessor. First, the ownership 
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system underwent a revolutionary change. Through the confiscation and 
socialist transformation of the old media, all media had by 1953 become 
state-owned or at least collective-owned, with no private ownership at all 
(Fang and Zhang 1998, 389). Second, the structure of the media system 
was also changed. Organs (dang bao 党报) and professional newspapers 
with a specific readership became the mainstay of the system, while pri-
vate and independent coterie-run newspapers disappeared.
According to the January 1954 statistics, of the total 258 newspapers 
above the provincial level, 151 were Party organs, such as the People’s 
Daily, which accounted for 58.5% of the total, and ranked first among 
all types of newspaper in China. This proportion has dropped, year on 
year, to 31.3%. However, beginning with the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
(fanyou yundong 反右运动) in 1957, the proportion of Party newspapers 
again rose each year, reaching 75% in 1961 and 84.4% in 1975 (Yu 1993, 
16). The Party Central Committee controls the Party media’s personnel 
appointments and the management structure, and has strict regulations 
on operations. Besides the Party Central Committee newspaper, at the 
same administrative level, all newspapers, periodicals, radio stations, pub-
lishing agencies, and other news and publishing organizations have to be 
supervised by the propaganda departments of the provincial (municipal) 
committees. Under the unified leadership of the Party and the govern-
ment, the national media have formed a well-organized, top-down media 
communication network for different regions and readerships.
As to the relationship between the Party and the Party newspaper, 
Party journalism has stated that the Party newspaper must be “a truly 
militant organ (真正战斗的党的机关报). It is not only to be a propagandist 
or agitator, but also the organizer for the collective. The collective does 
not refer to the newsroom co-workers or coterie, but to the entire party 
organization. Therefore, the party organ is not ‘simply a publicity prod-
uct for external propaganda’, but a ‘leader of working for both the Party 
and the masses’”. The Party organ should not only explain theories and 
strategies of Chinese revolution, but also “provide concrete suggestions 
for comrades to practise”. “The Party must use organs to inform and 
mobilize masses to carry out miscellaneous political activities and move-
ments. Organs are the mouthpiece of the Party. All people working for 
the organs as part of the Party must follow the will of the Party. Every 
act and every word must be taken into consideration of the Party’s influ-
ence”. All these quotations from the Party’s documents clearly define the 
role of the party organs as organizational communicators, rather than 
mass media. In Mao’s era, political movements constituted the main con-
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tent of China’s political life, in which party organs were fully used and 
gradually strengthened as vehicles for political mobilization and organi-
zation (Xu 2004, 4-12). 
Since 1978, the relationship between the Party and its media has 
not changed in principle. However, with the shift of the Party’s priori-
ties, the role of the Party media has also shifted from serving the class 
struggle to serving socialist modernization. At the same time, the media 
have initiated their own reforms with regard to commercialization and 
marketization. New accounting systems have been introduced, modern 
enterprise management has been implemented, and various market-
oriented sub-papers have been developed. Advertisements and multiple 
operations have been widely allowed to increase revenue, and China’s 
media industry has revealed a trend towards conglomeration. During 
this process, media products and their circulation have increased enor-
mously, while the share of party organs at all levels has steadily declined. 
In 2013, among the 1,915 types of newspaper published nationwide, 
there were only 400 Party newspapers, accounting for about 20% in total 
(China Journalists Association 2014). According to an official statement, 
China’s newspaper industry has gradually achieved a “basic pattern of 
multi-level and multi-type co-existence, dominated by the party organs, 
while supplemented by evening newspapers, metropolitan newspapers 
and industry-specific newspapers/magazines” (China Journalists Asso-
ciation 2017).
During the 1980s, television gradually became the most influential of 
the media. Due to the huge operating costs the state has played a major 
role in developing the television industry, and has thus taken control of 
its development. In 1985, television surpassed radio for the first time in 
the population coverage range, “becoming the most widely-received and 
most widespread of the media” (National People’s Broadcasting Station 
National Audience Survey Team 1988, 216). Television programmes are, 
in fact, more comprehensive, with news programmes accounting for only 
about 15% of total programmes. 
Although the marketization and conglomeration of the Chinese 
media have a reputation for top-down guidance and control, this does 
reflect the Party’s institutional adaptation to the new trends. The new 
administrative approval and licensing system for press and publications 
guarantees that the Party’s power should extend to the entire body of the 
media. In addition, it has also turned the Chinese media industry into a 
true monopoly market, where the limits of supply and the huge market-
ing demand for advertising have brought enormous profits to the media. 
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In 1994, China formally joined the internet, followed by a large 
number of internet media companies. In 1998, sina.com, sohu.com, and 
netease.com launched portal websites, one after another. In 2000, they 
were listed on Nasdaq. At the same time, China announced relevant laws 
and regulations to clearly license the main body of network news dis-
semination, especially the private commercial websites, and stipulated a 
series of qualifying principles. Websites offering a news service were cat-
egorized either as news media websites or as comprehensive (non-news) 
media websites. The latter may issue material from a news website, but 
may not publish news from its own news-gathering or from any other 
non-news media source (Ministry of Information Industry 2000). This 
provision continued guaranteeing the Party’s control of news content, 
but made the traditional media lose their advantages as news transmis-
sion channels. The traditional media also underestimated the potential 
of online media, and regarded non-news websites as just another “land-
ing place”, to which they could export their own news products. Thus, 
they “fed the new-born online media all the content at an ultra-low price, 
which were crying piteously for milk” (Yu 2014, 6-11). 
However, portal websites gave full play to the advantages of mass 
information gathering, hyperlinks, information classification and free 
browsing, which were totally beyond the traditional media’s ability and 
imagination. In addition, greater emphasis was placed on user preferences 
(such as categorizing information based on user preferences) and user 
interaction (such as open article comments). This user-oriented logic has 
become increasingly prominent in the new network format, from forums 
to blogs, to micro-blogs, to WeChats and micro-videos (such as TikTok). 
The internet industry went on building platforms to produce content for 
users and also to allow users to generate content (UGC).
The internet has demoted the Party media’s status from their once 
dominant role as news providers to ordinary information communica-
tors. In the past, the Party media controlled the whole process of news 
production, from news-making to news distribution, but they can now 
only maintain the monopoly of official news-making through Chinese 
media regulations. As to the distribution of news and information, they 
have been overwhelmed by the internet.
The internet has intensified the competition between the media. On 
the internet technology platform, various forms of media can be merged 
in various ways. Newspapers, radio and television are all competing for 
the attention of the audience on the same internet platform. The inter-
net has also intensified competition in content production. More and 
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more self-media are breaking the monopoly of traditional news content 
production, and are competing with formal media organizations. The 
Party media used to be regarded as the “platform for all news-gathering 
and aggregating”, but now they are only the “platform for authoritative 
news-gathering and aggregating”.
The internet has also changed the ways in which information is 
disseminated. Nowadays, the dissemination of news mainly depends on 
social networks and word-of-mouth communication, which means that 
the Party media dissemination channels are no longer as important as 
before. The internet has also changed the ways in which the effects of 
communication are assessed. In the past, the media could only measure 
the effects of communication indirectly, through surveys, circulation or 
audience ratings. In China, some of the methods for evaluating media 
effects are unreliable with regard to whether a news product has stimu-
lated practical problem-solving, or whether it has attracted high-level 
attention. However, the internet has brought user-oriented, measurable 
assessment methods, such as page views, number of fans, compliments 
and comments, to the media product. It can even attract high-level atten-
tion through opinion leaders and the “Internet Navy” (wangluoshuijun 
网络水军). 
The vast amount of information provided by the internet has 
greatly occupied the public’s attention and has reduced their demand 
for the Party media’s official news. In addition, there is an imbalance 
in the supply of news among the Party media. The most numerous and 
most influential central-level Party media are gathered around central 
government, which focuses on national policy-making and concentrates 
on vocalization to promote and spread government policies. The Party 
media can also be used as tools by central government to urge local and 
grass-roots governmental bodies to implement their policies. But among 
the local and grass-roots governments, which focus on policy implemen-
tation, there is a lack of sufficient resources from the Party media. When 
citizens spontaneously set public agendas through the internet, it is the 
local governments which are easily challenged and affected.
Xi’s claim that “the Party media’s surname must be ‘Party’ (党媒姓党)” 
once again set the original tone for the Party media, but while they all 
actively follow his call, they continue with media transformation and 
integration development as well. On the one hand, the Party media iden-
tify with “the organs of the ruling party at all levels” and stand firmly at 
the forefront of political propaganda making. On the other hand, they 
make full use of their political and brand resources as Party media to 
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catch up with technological progress and the needs of users, in order to 
be active participants in media market competition. This dual identity 
leads to multiple tasks and modes of communication in the name of the 
Party media’s mission. 
3. The Party media’s modes of involvement
 in political communication
In the West, most of the research on media and public policy is related 
to political elections. In general, the media play two main roles: first, 
the media are the means by which politicians pass on their campaign 
promises to voters (Strömberg 2004). Second, the media are the chan-
nels through which politicians can monitor the political environment 
(Deutsch 1963). If we regard the media merely as an intermediary, we 
may underestimate the power of media agenda-setting. American politi-
cal scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz particularly emphasize 
this point. They point out that one aspect of power is, of course, whether 
it can influence the decision-making process, but the other important 
aspect of power is whether it affects the setting of the agenda (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962).
Owing to the tremendous energy of the media, Western scholars 
are profoundly introspective about the “mediatization phenomenon” 
(i.e., that the political institutions are increasingly being shaped by the 
media). Thomas Meyer calls this “media colonizing politics” and believes 
that the media’s selection rules and presentation rules can control the 
logic of democracy (Meyer and Hinchman 2002, 49-72). Contrary to 
this, scholarly criticism of the Chinese media is mainly directed at the 
“politicization” and “non-democratic” nature of the media, i.e., that poli-
tics can easily influence and control the media. In this regard, in 2006, 
Chinese scholar Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 proposed a new perspective on 
how to judge whether a system is democratic (Wang 2006).
Wang Shaoguang also proposed that the key to judging whether 
a political system is “democracy” or not is to examine whether policy-
makers in the public policy agenda can respond to social concerns (Wang 
2006). He divided the public policy agenda into three categories: the 
media agenda, the public agenda, and the policy agenda. Wang noted 
the importance of the media agenda, but since his core concern was the 
issue of “democracy” (i.e., whether the policy agenda could reflect the 
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public agenda), he did not examine in detail how the media affected the 
public agenda and the policy agenda. Instead, he focused on the relation-
ship between the public agenda and the policy agenda. According to the 
identity of the agenda presenter and the degree of public participation, 
he classified six kinds of agenda-setting models, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. – Modes of Chinese public policy agenda-setting.
Agenda presenter
Decision maker Brains trust Civic society
Degree
of public 
participation
Low
(1)
Closed-door
mode
(3)
Internal reference 
mode
(5)
Submission
mode
High
(2)
Mobilization
mode
(4)
Borrowing
mode
(6)
External pressure 
mode
In the table, Wang does not discuss the media as a subject that influences 
the policy agenda, but as an intermediary between the policy agenda 
and the public agenda. He does not present the media role in the three 
modes of “low level of public participation” (i.e., closed-door mode, 
internal reference mode and submission mode), but only talks about the 
importance of the media agenda in the modes of “high level of public 
participation” (mobilization mode, borrowing mode and external pres-
sure mode). From Wang’s words, we can see that his knowledge of the 
Chinese media system, especially the role of the Chinese Party media, 
is far from adequate. Based on the interpretation of the Chinese Party 
media’s dual identity in both internal and external communication, this 
paper proposes six of the Party media’s typical communication modes for 
our observation and examination of contemporary Chinese media and 
political communication. 
3.1. Internal reference
“Internal reference” (neican 内参) is a form of non-public media report-
ing with Chinese characteristics, which has been the main agent of the 
“eye-and-ear” function of the Party media for a long time. As early as 
1931, when the Red China News Agency, the predecessor of the Xinhua 
News Agency, started publication, it was responsible for copying the 
news broadcast from the Kuomintang Central News Agency and other 
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radio stations. The collected news was compiled as a reference resource 
and was exclusively provided for the decision-making circle of the Soviet 
Central Bureau and the senior leadership of the Red Army.
Internal reference is different from public reporting. First, the 
focuses of reporting are different; internal reference is concerned with 
the more significant and sensitive issues. Second, the audience is dif-
ferent; internal reference belongs to state secret and quasi-state secret 
documents. Third, the two have different ways of generating social reac-
tion; public reports promote problem-solving through public opinion, 
while internal reports solve problems through instructions from a high-
ranking official (lingdao pishi 领导批示).
Xinhua News Agency was the first to carry out internal reference. 
There are two main internal materials within the CCP: “Reference 
News”, following international news, and “Internal Reference”, following 
domestic dynamics, and both are handled by the Xinhua News Agency. 
In 1953, in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions on the Xinhua 
News Agency’s internal reference system, all major regions, provinces 
and cities began to collect local news and publish their own internal 
reference materials. Since then, internal reference for news has been 
established as a system within the Party media. Today, media at all levels, 
as an extension of the Party and government, have internal reference 
mechanisms. Internal reference mainly consists of the following three 
types: (1) Xinhua News Agency’s internal reference; (2) the central Party 
media’s internal reference and the provincial Party media’s internal refer-
ence; and (3) some central ministries, who also use internal reference to 
report recent situations (Yin 2012). 
Take the Xinhua News Agency, for example. There is an interior 
division in the Xinhua News Agency called the Reference News Editing 
Department 2. The writing for internal reference can be divided into two 
types: top-down and bottom-up. The top-down one is called “Mandatory 
Research” (dianti diaoyan 点题调研). The central political élites will usually 
make their concerns known by sending their written directive (pishi 批示) 
to the Xinhua News Agency. Members of the editorial meeting, chaired 
by the Chief Editor, will determine the focus and topic of research, set 
up a research team and send instructions to all branch agencies at home 
and abroad. Each branch agency will select topics according to their local 
conditions, and complete their research reports with important news. The 
 2 See the official introduction to the Reference News Editing Department of 
Xinhua News Agency: http://203.192.6.89/xhs/jgsz/2009-11/03/c_1378162.htm.
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bottom-up type is conducted by local branches themselves. The Reference 
News Editing Department edits and selects important news gathered from 
the various branches. All the selected materials will be included in the peri-
odical series of journals, such as Domestic Dynamic Samples (国内动态清样), 
Reference Samples (参考清样), and other internal reference publications, 
such as “Internal Reference” and “Selected Internal Reference”. 
In 2016, the Xinhua News Agency published more than 42,659 
internal reference articles, covering 126 domestic-specific research topics, 
such as “economic hotspot tracking” and “innovation and new economic 
dynamics”, and nearly 82 international-specific research topics, such as 
“American election series reports” and “world-leading technologies” 
(Xinhua News Agency 2017, 218).
Internal reference aims to illustrate a situation and its issues, pays 
more attention to timeliness, and has lower requirements on writing 
skills or rhetoric, which can make editing easier and more efficient. Thus, 
it stimulates the enthusiasm of reporters in writing internal reports. 
The criteria for evaluating internal reference news is just “thinking 
what the central government wants, urging the central government’s 
urgency”. Obtaining the central élite’s direct instructions means success. 
According to the statistics, in the first half of 2016, the Xinhua News 
Agency’s internal reference received 1,497 instructions from the political 
centre, of which the most senior leader, General Secretary Xi Jinping, 
gave 40 instructions (Xinhua News Agency 2017, 219). It is precisely 
because of this incentive mechanism that the internal reference focuses 
on the attention of the central leadership and it might be difficult to 
comprehensively identify problems.
3.2. Online public opinion monitoring
With the development of the internet, more and more people can expose 
hidden truths and express their opinions through the internet, and some 
posts even cause mass protests and media coverage of events. At the 
beginning, however, restricted by policies, the traditional Party media 
could not fully play their roles.
In 2004, the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on 
Strengthening the Construction of the Party’s Governing Capacity”, 
passed by the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Com-
mittee, put forward the requirement to strengthen the management of 
public sentiment, and thus prompted research on public sentiment.
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After the responsive government theory was proposed, more and 
more government departments paid attention to responding through 
the internet. Since 2009, the Public Sentiment Monitoring Office of 
People’s Daily Online has regularly published research findings, such as 
“Rankings of Local Government’s Ability on Online Public Opinion 
Responsiveness” and “The Online Public Sentiment Index of Central 
Enterprises”. It has also put forward a series of new ideas on respond-
ing to public sentiment, such as “four gold hours on handling emer-
gencies”, “cultivate in-system opinion leaders”, “the internet’s backward 
force mechanism on reform”. It has also compiled reference books and 
provided long-term counselling on crisis public relations for government 
and business. These services bring additional economic benefits to the 
media. The New Media Blue Book, published by the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences in July 2010 (Yin 2010), points out that the launch 
of the public opinion channel by People’s Daily Online is remarkable. 
It shows that the Party Central Committee and the mainstream media 
attach great importance to the supervision of online media, exceeding 
traditional media supervision, and have also become the promoters and 
practitioners of China’s democratic system in the New Media age.
3.3. Media think tanks
Media think tanks are the Party media’s latest project. On 20 Janu-
ary 2015, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the 
General Office of the State Council issued “Opinions on Strengthening 
the Construction of New Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics”, 
stressing that “a new type of think tank with Chinese characteristics 
is an important support for scientific and democratic decision-making. 
The decision-making consultation system is an important part of China’s 
socialist democratic politics construction”. It also states that it “supports 
the Party School of the Central Committee of CCP, the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering, the Development Research Centre of the State 
Council, the National School of Administration, the China Association 
for Science and Technology, the central news media, and some univer-
sities, research institutes [and] institutes of military systems, [which] 
should conduct pilot projects for high-end think tanks” (General Office 
of the Communist Party of China and General Office of the State Coun-
cil 2015).
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At the end of 2015, the Xinhua News Agency was approved as one 
of the first ten national high-end think tank pilots directly under the 
Party Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Mili-
tary Commission. Set up within the famous magazine Outlook Weekly 
(瞭望新闻周刊), the think tank was named Liaowang Institute (瞭望智库) 
and became a public policy research center. Marked by this, the Party 
media have embraced the media think tank era and formally participate 
in decision-making consultations.
When compared with media think tanks, news internal reference 
is still a form of news. It has strong time limits and authenticity, but 
only reflects objective conditions and does not recommend and conduct 
in-depth research on an issue. As for decision-making consultation, 
think tanks must undertake the entire task of presenting, analyzing and 
solving problems. In May 2016, fifteen Chinese media announced that 
they were establishing a think-tank, or an overall transition to a think 
tank, including four central Party media, two provincial Party media, 
four market-based media, and five portal sites (Wu, Xia, and Ma 2016). 
The development of media think tanks took place against the back-
ground of media integration, and was the result of media transforma-
tion and media management. It has a strong market orientation, and its 
service targets include both government policy consulting and corporate 
consulting.
The methods of running media think tanks can be summarized 
by category. The first method is through the strategic co-operation of 
“media + think tanks”, that is, media associated with traditional think 
tanks, such as universities and research institutes, sharing intellectual 
resources and media resources. For example, the Zhejiang Daily and the 
Zhejiang Provincial Institute of Public Policy established that sort of 
co-operation: the Zhejiang Provincial Institute of Public Policy regularly 
provides the Zhejiang Daily with expert resources, while the Zhejiang 
Daily publishes the Institute’s research results and information on theme 
salons in a timely manner (Zhu, Wu, and Ma 2017, 40-43). 
The second method is to conduct a special research programme 
with the “conference” at its core, that is, to take advantage of the media’s 
conference and public relations, and to invite scholars, experts, and prac-
titioners to discuss and publish the conference’s important opinions. 
The third is to establish the media’s own research team and conduct 
research services with media advantages. The Xinhua News Agency’s 
think tank is at the forefront of this project. Its Liaowang Research 
Report has already established a route to the General Office of the Central 
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Committee. It has also launched “Global Think Tank Tracking”, “Macro 
Risk Observation”, “Commodity Trend Observation” and “Commodity 
Special Report”, etc. The General Office of the Central Committee also 
provides tasks and topics for think tanks, such as “Deepening Reforms”, 
“Hong Kong Issues”, “Xinjiang Issues”, etc.
There are two main comparative advantages for the media’s self-
employed research team: one is that the media’s reporter network has 
rapid access to information; the other is that reporters’ unofficial identity 
and their abilities in communication and research can provide unique 
insights for their reports. The Party media have accumulated valuable 
experience on public sentiment, and today many of the Party media have 
established a public opinion analysis team, and regularly provide moni-
toring services for the higher authorities.
3.4. Policy advocacy
Policy advocacy is one of the most important tasks of the Chinese Party 
media. As Chairman Mao said in his well-known “Talk to the Editors of 
Jinsui Daily”, “The role and power of the newspapers consists in their 
ability to bring the Party’s programme and line, the Party’s general and 
specific policies, its tasks and working methods before the masses in the 
quickest and most extensive way […]. It is a leading art of Marxism-
Leninism to be good at turning the Party’s policies into the actions of 
the masses and to make every movement and struggle known not only 
by the cadres but also by the masses” (Xu 2004, 70). Mao made full use 
of his Party newspaper to lead the Great Leap Forward Movement, with 
catastrophic results. 
Nowadays in China, the Party media still shoulder the task of policy 
advocacy, but, in fact, the function of mobilizing the masses to carry out 
political movements has been greatly reduced, which means that Chinese 
politics has gradually bid farewell to political movements and turned to 
governmental administration and legalization.
The policy propaganda of the Party media breaks through the top-
down communication process within the bureaucratic system. While the 
central policy is conveyed and mobilized in the form of documents and 
meetings within the bureaucratic system, it is also issued to the entire 
nation through the Party media, and the corresponding propaganda and 
mobilization campaign is carried out through the co-operation of the 
media and the organization “Media Campaign”. Through widely dis-
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seminated publicity, the media try to create a positive opinion atmos-
phere, in order to attract the approval and participation of the masses. 
This kind of political communication is still very common in China, but 
the effect on social mobilization is not good. Many local organizations 
present the Party media’s reports as their working achievements, but do 
not care about the effect of those reports, as there is little measurement 
of the audience’s attention, understanding and approval. 
3.5. Media supervision
In October 1987, the 13th National Congress of the Party for the first 
time put forward the concept of “public opinion supervision” (yulun 
jiandu 舆论监督), which in fact referred to media supervision under the 
leadership of the Party. Since then, this concept has been mentioned and 
interpreted in all Party Congress documents. It was also brought into 
“The Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision (Trial)”, promulgated in 
2004 (CPC Central Committee 2004).
Media supervision originates from the early critical media reports of 
the Party newspaper. It aimed to correct the shortcomings and mistakes 
of practical work through critical media reports, in order to realize the 
Party’s principle of “seeking truth from facts”. However, the tradition of 
Party media criticism was totally destroyed during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, but gradually recovered following the reform and opening-up poli-
cies. 
The choice of media supervision instead of critical reports is not a 
minor semantic modification, but a symbol of conceptual progress. In the 
past, the so-called critical reports were mainly used by the Party as tools 
for guidance. If something went wrong with the guiding line, the media 
critical reports could still follow the wrong track and thus amplify the 
error with terrible results. During the Great Leap Forward Movement, 
such examples could be seen almost everywhere. Media supervision 
emphasizes that the people should be allowed to criticize the shortcom-
ings and mistakes in the Party’s work, and thus the Party returned the 
right to criticize to the public and the media, a kind of empowerment, 
though to a limited degree. The Party media used to be tools for political 
mobilization and ideological education for the people; now the function 
of the tools has been officially extended to public criticism. 
Media supervision has expanded the media coverage of news report-
ing, media comments, public discussion and the criticism of various 
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 5 (2018) 2
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/ - Online issn 2421-0293 - Print issn 2284-1881
Xu Jing and Wang Dengfeng
28
social phenomena. During this process, the media agenda may be set by 
media people themselves, and may exert influence on the public agenda 
or even the policy agenda. Although such supervision has to “adhere to 
the principle of Party spirit” and must be carried out under the leader-
ship of the Party, it is clearly different from the so-called “Fourth Estate” 
function of the Western media.
Since 1987, media coverage in the name of supervision has gradu-
ally increased and has become the top priority in the media’s daily 
work. In 1994, CCTV launched a prime-time news programme called 
Focus Interview (焦点访谈), which was a very popular programme, 
because of its focus on practical problems and public concerns. When 
the audience ratings were at their highest, over 300 million people 
viewed it each evening. Many of the problems disclosed by the Focus 
Interview programme attracted the attention of the central and local 
government authorities, directly leading to the rapid solution of prob-
lems that had been overlooked for years. In 2002, the Office of the 
State Council set up a special feedback mechanism connected to Focus 
Interview, and 41 reports resulting from that were included in the 
State Council supervision mechanism (Sun 2003, 113). Focus Interview 
was once a milestone in media supervision in China, but it is now no 
longer in evidence.
Alongside the concept of media supervision, there has also been an 
emphasis on the principle of openness. Together with the step-by-step 
opening-up of government affairs, Party affairs and judicial affairs, and 
the establishment of the Government Information Disclosure, the news 
media have also extended their coverage to many more fields than before, 
in order to fulfil the people’s right to know. 
The Party media have greater advantages in influencing the public 
agenda and the policy agenda through investigative criticism, but their 
limitations are also obvious. Supervision of the Party media must be car-
ried out under the leadership of the Party, and some significant critical 
reports on Party members and cadres therefore need to be approved by 
the Party Committees at the same level and with regard to the direction 
of public opinion. Media supervision is not an independent media right, 
since all the Party media are directly or indirectly affiliated to different 
levels of party and governmental organizations, and are thus enabled to 
interview, report and criticize at different administrative levels. Some 
scholars have identified two methods of media supervision in practice: 
one method is supervision by the upper-level media of the lower-level 
government, which is more or less the extension of administrative 
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powers; the other method is cross-regional supervision, which means 
that critics are dominated by non-local media. Challenged by the super-
vision of non-local media, the local media either selectively lose their 
voice or become the tools of the government media in a counter-attack.
3.6. Guidance of public opinion 
As mentioned above, in policy advocacy, the media agenda is deeply 
affected or shaped by the policy agenda, and the Party media have privi-
leged access to authentic information from the highest level, while bear-
ing the responsibility for attracting the public’s attention and setting the 
direction of the public agenda. In media supervision mode, based on 
professional journalistic capabilities, the Party media need to compete 
with other media for agenda-setting, and this may actively influence 
the public agenda and even the policy agenda, depending on the media 
agency. 
Along with the development of the internet, however, huge num-
bers of WeMedia keep on emerging, and citizen journalism is becom-
ing the trend. More and more eye-catching news was first exposed by 
internet users through social media, and then inspired some network 
public opinion leaders, so that issues brewing online could finally set the 
public agenda. When online discussions become fierce, especially if they 
become a collective protest, this will inevitably attract the media’s atten-
tion, or even set the media agenda. As an agent of mass communication, 
the Party media feel obliged to respond to the public agenda and strive 
to play a guiding role in bridging the gap between the public and the 
government. Thus, if the government is neutral to the focal event or 
just a referee, then the Party media usually intervene in time to guide 
the public agenda, prompting a solution of the issues. But if the criti-
cal spearhead is just directed at the government, then the Party media’s 
agenda may not be able to reflect the public agenda, and may either go 
to aphasia or confront the public agenda. It thus depends on the Party 
media’s awareness and its sensitivity to Chinese politics, especially to 
inner party struggles. Those who have courage, strategy and significant 
connections may finally win. Lu Xinning in the People’s Daily set a good 
example. When most of the Party media hesitated to participate in online 
public debate, she elaborately planned a series of news comments in the 
People’s Daily, which reflected both its “Party” surname and journalistic 
professionalism.
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4. Conclusion and further theoretical introspection
“The press always takes on the form and colouration of the social and 
political structures within which it operates” (Siebert et al. 1956, 2). 
Every society has its own developing trajectory. The nature of the media 
cannot be deduced from the technical aspect only, but needs to “contex-
tualize the media, especially the news media” (Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
From this point of view, this paper has described and analyzed the Party 
media’s modes of political communication in the context of the political 
and socio-cultural changes in China since the reform and opening-up 
policies of 1978. However, the main purpose is not to explain “how the 
historical context of the development of China’s journalism is obviously 
different from that of Western countries” (ibid.), but an attempt to join 
in the study of comparative media systems, seeking similarities, while 
“highlighting the diversity of media systems in the world” (ibid.).
In terms of methodology, this article follows the paradigm of struc-
tural functionalism. Merton (2006) once praised functionalism as a super 
method; and J.C. Alexander, who advocates new functionalism, also 
believes that “functionalism does not mean a set of concepts, a sort of 
method, a kind of theoretical model, or an ideology; instead, it is a tradi-
tion” (Alexander 1985, 1-2). This paper hopes to inherit the theoretical 
tradition of functionalism concerning the relationship between totality 
and locality, function and structure, and to agree with Durkheim’s view 
that social change is a process of social differentiation. Unlike Parsoni-
anism, it avoids the perspective of maintaining the “balance” of the social 
system, thus turning the study of structure and function into the study 
of social control.
From the description of the Chinese Party media’s participation in 
political communication, this paper will turn to functional analysis. The 
so-called “functional analysis” is what Merton explicitly states about 
“how one [of the social or cultural aspects] works in society” (Merton 
2006). The definition of function comes from Radcliffe Brown, an 
anthropologist highly regarded by Merton. Starting from Durkheim’s 
interpretation of the function of social customs, he defines function as 
“the consistency between custom and the necessary conditions for the 
social organism’s survival” (Alexander 1985). In the author’s opinion, 
the fact is that the Party media’s participation in political communica-
tion is a kind of political “custom”. In Chairman Mao’s era, the function 
of the Party media in organizational communication was unilaterally 
played to the extreme, and finally ran counter to media characteristics. 
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By comparison, at present, the Party media are clear about their dual 
identities and constantly strive to exert their media function in different 
ways, adapting to contemporary Chinese social and political structures. 
In the process of adapting, the Chinese Party media have also produced 
some structural characteristics of their own. Owing to limited space, a 
detailed discussion on the structural changes to the Party media cannot 
be undertaken here. In order to evaluate the impact of the Party media’s 
structural changes on the Chinese media system, an examination of the 
political and social structures may lead to further relevant questions for 
future research. In general, it is of great academic importance to study 
the Chinese Party media’s involvement in political communication. 
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